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1. Introduction
On a Gricean account of communication, what is communicated by an utterance
frequently consists of two layers: what is said and what is conversationally impli-
cated.1 Consider one of Grice’s well-known examples: Professor Y is writing a
letter of recommendation for Mr. X, a pupil of Y, who intends to apply for a phi-
losophy job. The letter contains a single sentence:
(1) Mr. X’s command of English is excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been regular
(Grice, 1989 [henceforth: WoW]: 33).
What is Y saying here? In cases where sentences contain ambiguous terms or
indexicals, things will become a little more complicated; however, in the case of
(1), we can identify what is being said with the conventional linguistic meaning
of that sentence (see WoW 25). Now, obviously, what Y is attempting to convey
by writing (1) goes beyond the literal content of (1). How can an addressee Z
grasp the implicatum, that is, the “extra” content S is communicating? Grice’s
answer to that question is as simple as it is resourceful (WoW 26-7): Z just has to
assume that Y is a rational speaker who communicates cooperatively. More spe-
cifically, Grice claims that cooperative communication is guided by four maxims
1 In cases where an utterance contains words such as “but” or “therefore,” there will be an additional
layer of conventional implicatures. Because conventional implicature is a highly contested issue (see,
e.g., Bach, 1999 vs. Potts, 2005), I shall ignore this layer altogether in what follows. Accordingly, when
I use “implicature” here, the term ought to be read as “conversational implicature”.
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according to which utterances ought to be informative (“quantity”), truthful and
justified (“quality”), relevant (“relation”), and perspicuous (“manner”).
In the case of (1), it is evident that the sentence’s literal content does not meet
these requirements: (1) is neither informative nor relevant. However, on the
assumption that Y is a cooperative speaker, Z may take Y to be implicating some-
thing informative and relevant which Y did not want to write down:
(1a) Mr. X is no good at philosophy (WoW 33).2
Now why should we assume that (1a) is exactly what Y implicated by uttering
(1), instead of, say, “Mr. X is a moron”? This is an instance of the more general
problem of whether implicata are, at least to some extent, indeterminate — a
problem that goes well beyond the scope of this paper. (I will, however, briefly
come back to that issue in §7.) What matters, for present purposes, is another
alternative to (1a): one might argue that what Y conveys by uttering (1) is one of
Y’s beliefs:
(1b) Y believes that Mr. X is no good at philosophy.
Whereas (1b) is what I shall call an “epistemic implicatum,”3 (1a) is non-episte-
mic. Now quite a few scholars such as Horn (2010) have argued that many types
of implicature (most notably quantity implicatures) are epistemic, and scholars
such as Geurts (2010) have advanced the stronger claim that what is conveyed
via implicature is (almost) always one of the speaker’s mental states. In this paper,
I shall argue to the contrary: within a Gricean framework, there is no reason to
suppose that there are epistemic implicatures, although I concede that there are
some exceptions. Why is that important? I think there are at least three reasons
for paying closer attention to that issue:
First, the issue is an important internal problem for any theory of implicature.
Communicating that something is the case is, obviously, different from communi-
cating that you believe so, and blurring the distinction between these two kinds
of implicata by using brackets (“[S believes that] Mr. X is no good at philoso-
phy”), which is what some scholars have done, would amount to dodging a ques-
tion instead of answering it.4
2 One may suspect that the retrieval of that implicatum is not just guided by Gricean maxims but also
by certain rhetorical conventions, in this case the convention of “damning by faint praise” (see
Sainsbury, 1984, p. 422). See also Davis (1998) and Lepore and Stone (2015), who argue that
implicatures in general are much more conventional than Grice would have acknowledged.
3 I am using epistemic as a term that covers epistemic as well as doxastic states, as is common in epi-
stemic logic.
4 See, for example, Matsumoto (1995). When discussing some alleged cases of conventional
implicature in earlier work (Sander, 2019, §4), I also dodged the question.
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The second point has to do with the notion of communication. According to
the code, or transmission, model of communication (see, respectively, Green,
2007, p. 7; Davis, 2003, p. 96), communication is essentially a transferal of men-
tal states from one mind to another. Plainly, epistemic implicata are congenial to,
or a corollary of, such an account. If communication generally “consists in the
expression of beliefs, thoughts, or ideas” (Davis, 2003, p. 167), then communicat-
ing via implicature will plausibly be a matter of conveying epistemic states, too.
If, however, you are sceptical about such Lockean accounts of communication,
you should also be sceptical about the idea of epistemic implicata.5 This is so
because, from a Gricean point of view, the difference between saying and impli-
cating is not a matter of content but a mere matter of how contents are conveyed.
So prima facie there is no reason to think that “what-is-said”-contents are ordi-
nary propositional contents, whereas implicated contents concern the respective
speaker’s epistemic states — and we shall see in the course of this paper that
there are neither any specific properties of implicature that would speak in favour
of such an asymmetry. If the transmission model offers the only plausible ratio-
nale for embracing epistemic implicata, then anti-Lockeans have no reason
whatsoever to assume that implicata are about the speaker’s mental states.
Third, I think recent debates in pragmatics have corroborated a claim advanced
by Sainsbury already a few of decades ago. According to Sainsbury, there is an
“enormous variety of cases” (1984, p. 416) in which addressees may learn more
from an utterance than what the speaker actually says. Thus, in order to fully
understand human communication, we ought to attend to important differences
among these cases and should not use the term “conversational implicature” as a
one-size-fits-all cap. Accordingly, I do not wish to deny that addressees frequently
infer something about a speaker’s epistemic states and that such inferences bear
some similarities to implicatures; such inferences, however, should not be reg-
arded as cases of implicature proper.
I shall proceed as follows. Section 2 says a little more about the idea of episte-
mic implicata. In section 3, I then show how that idea is connected to the “stan-
dard recipe” for calculating implicata. Although two kinds of epistemic implicata
figure prominently in that recipe (“weak” implicata of the form “S does not
believe that p” and “strong” implicata of the form “S believes that not-p”), there
is, on Grice’s original account of implicature, just a single non-epistemic
implicatum. In section 4, I argue that many weak implicata are not implicata in
the first place because their content would be tantamount to the proposition that
5 One salient alternative to the code model would be Brandom’s (1994, pp. 141–198) “scorekeeping
model of discursive practice” (although Brandom rarely uses the term communication). For a similar
account, partly inspired by Brandom, see Geurts (2019).
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the speaker is conforming to a certain maxim, which would infringe Grice’s non-
triviality requirement. Section 5 then turns to strong implicata and presents the
core argument of this paper: assuming that implicata are epistemic would imply
that speakers are generally either less or more informative than required, which
would infringe the maxim of quantity. In section 6, I shall have a closer look at
what speakers might implicate by uttering disjunctive statements and also at
Grice’s notion of “non-truth-functional ground.” Finally, in section 7, I argue that
“epistemic implicata” might best be construed as members of a larger family of
implicature-like phenomena.
2. Epistemic Implicata
For a start, consider sentence (2), as uttered by some speaker S:
(2) B is either crazy or a liar.
On the standard view (see, e.g., Levinson, 2000, pp. 108–109; Geurts, 2010,
pp. 59–64), disjunctions such as (2) carry two distinct conversational
implicatures. First, there is an ignorance (or “clausal”) implicature, which is
essentially epistemic: by uttering (2), S implicates that S does not know whether
B is crazy or whether B is a liar. Second, there is a scalar implicature which
involves the proposition that B is not crazy and a liar.6
Let us first turn to the scalar implicatum. I said that, in this case, the
implicatum “involves” the proposition that B is not crazy and a liar because we
may construe the proposition that is conveyed by the speaker as either epistemic
or non-epistemic. Although all Griceans will agree on what might be dubbed the
“propositional core” of the implicatum, there is no consensus on whether the core
is to be construed as having an “epistemic shell.” Accordingly, all of the follow-
ing propositions have been proposed as implicata in contemporary scholarship:
(2a) B is not crazy and a liar.
(2b) A knows that B is not crazy and a liar.
(2c) A does not believe that B is crazy and a liar.
(2d) A believes that B is not crazy and a liar.
(2e) For all A knows, B is not crazy and a liar.
Now, many scholars claim or take it for granted that many, perhaps all, implicata
are epistemic. That certain kinds of implicatures, such as quantity and clausal
6 Surprisingly, and in contrast to what some scholars assume (Davis, 1998, p. 145), exclusivity
implicatures are not discussed by Grice himself. Horn seems to be the first one who has construed
them (1972, §2.11) as scalar implicatures. Thanks to an anonymous reader for bringing that to my
attention.
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implicatures, are epistemic seems to be a near-consensus (see, e.g., Gazdar, 1979,
pp. 55–62; Levinson, 2000, pp. 75–79; Horn, 2010, pp. 315–316),7 and
Geurts (2010, p. 14) makes the still stronger claim that implicata “will generally
be of the form ‘S believes that ...’, ‘S does not know whether ...’, etc.” Geurts
allows for cases where the implicatum is a non-epistemic mental state such as a
desire, but he seems to assume that all implicata are of the form “S ψ-s (or does
not ψ) that p” (where “ψ” stands for a propositional attitude verb).
This idea is in striking contrast to what Grice seems to have assumed. In his
seminal “Logic and Conversation,” (WoW, 22-40) Grice briefly discusses approx-
imately a dozen examples of implicature, and in nearly all cases Grice takes the
implicatum to be a proposition about the world and not about one of the speaker’s
mental states. Take the recommendation letter from §1 as an example: what is
implicated by an utterance of (1) is simply that Mr. X is no good at philosophy,
and the same goes for almost all of the other examples discussed by Grice. For
Grice, then, implicata are almost never of the form “S ψ-s (or doesn’t ψ) that p.”
There is, however, one exception:
(3) A: Where does C live?
B: Somewhere in the South of France.
According to Grice, B implicates here “that he does not know in which town C
lives” (WoW 33). I will argue below that we ought to reject that claim for reasons
that naturally fall out of Grice’s overall picture of implicature, but it is (in part, at
least) easy to see why he arrived at that conclusion. In many other alleged cases of
epistemic implicature, the epistemic shell (as I called it) is optional and can thus be
put in brackets (“[S believes that] Mr. X is no good at philosophy”). In the case at
hand, this bracketing manoeuvre obviously fails because the locution outside the
brackets would not be a propositional content (“[S does not know] in which town
C lives”). Accordingly, the ignorance implicatum “S does not know in which town
C lives” is, if it is an implicatum at all, an essentially epistemic implicatum.
It might seem clear, then, that there are essentially epistemic implicata. In what
follows, I will argue that there are not. Ignorance implicatures may be some kind
of pragmatic inference; they are not, however, implicatures in any strict sense of
that term. More generally, I will argue that implicata typically are not proposi-
tions about the respective speaker’s mental states. Accordingly, using “Δ” as a
placeholder for epistemic verbs, my two central claims can be put like this:
(A) Alleged implicata of the form Δ p generally are not implicata in the first place.
(B) In nearly all cases where scholars assume implicata of the form Δ p, the real implicatum is
just p.
7 For that reason, such implicatures will serve as the main examples in this paper.
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Before proceeding, I would like to stress the word “nearly” in claim (B) and the
word “generally” in (A). My point is not that there are not any epistemic
implicata. Sometimes people do not talk about the world but about their epistemic
stances, and in such cases, there are likely to be epistemic implicata. (A salient
example is the phenomenon known as “neg-raising” [see, e.g., Horn, 2001,
§ 5.2]. Although this is a rather contested issue, it seems plausible that many
utterances of the form “A does not believe that p” implicate “A believes that not-p”.)
What I want to claim, though, is that in most standard cases of (particularised or
generalised) implicature, the implicatum is non-epistemic. The next section will
identify a possible rationale for thinking otherwise.
3. The Standard Recipe
Although there has been a controversy about the exact nature of epistemic
implicata,8 the question of whether implicata are epistemic at all has received vir-
tually no attention in the literature. Now lack of explicit arguments for some
claim p can often be explained, and would be justified, by the idea that p is either
self-evident or an obvious consequence of some unproblematic assumptions. In
our case, the main assumption seems to be that there are scenarios in which a
speaker S conveys an implicatum of the form “S does not believe/know that p,”
simply because S is not in an epistemic position to decide whether p or not-p.
Furthermore, weak implicatures of the form “S does not believe/know that p”
seem to be systematically linked to strong implicatures of the form “S believes/
knows that not-p”. These two assumptions are built into a scheme for calculating
implicatures which Geurts (2010, p. 27) has aptly called the “Standard Recipe”
(=SR). Take, for instance, sentence (4):
(4) Bonnie stole some of the pears. (Geurts, 2010, p. 27)
How can an addressee find out what an utterer of (4) intended to implicate? Here
is SR, as applied to (4):
(SR-4)
i. Rather than saying (4), Clyde could have made a stronger statement: (4*) Bonnie stole all the
pears. (…)
ii. The most likely explanation is that Clyde does not believe that (4*) is true: ¬BelC(4*).
iii. Clyde is likely to have an opinion as to whether (4*) is true: BelC(4*) _ BelC(¬(4*)).
8 For this debate on “weak” versus “strong” theories see, for example, Levinson (2000, pp. 75–79);
van Rooij and Schulz (2004, pp. 494–495); Sauerland (2004, pp. 382–387); Geurts (2010, pp. 28–30);
Horn (2010, pp. 315–316).
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iv. Between them, (ii) and (iii) entail BelC(¬(4*)): Clyde believes that Bonnie did not steal all the
pears. (Geurts, 2010, pp. 27–28, numbers changed; for similar reconstructions see,
e.g., Levinson, 1983, pp. 134–136; Atlas, 2005, pp. 52–53)9.
According to this rendering of an addressee’s reasoning, there are actually two
epistemic implicata: the weak implicatum ¬BelC(4*) and the strong implicatum
BelC(¬(4*)), which follows logically from the weak implicatum if Clyde is
assumed to believe either p or not-p.10
I should stress that I do not see any significant problems with (SR) in itself or
in its application to (4): (SR-4) seems to be quite a plausible representation of the
reasoning by means of which an addressee retrieves an implicatum. This fact in
itself, however, does not yet show that ¬BelC(4*) and BelC(¬(4*)) are actually
implicata. If we accept a crucial claim Grice made, (SR-4) would even demon-
strate that ¬BelC(4*) and BelC(¬(4*)) are not implicata. Here are two of Grice’s
elucidations of the notion of conversational implicature:
(A) A man who, by … saying … that p has implicated that q, may be said to have conversationally
implicated that q, provided that … the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, q is
required in order to make his saying … consistent with [the] presumption [that he is observing
the Cooperative Principle]. (WoW 30-1)
(B) [An] implicatum (factual or imperatival) is the content of that psychological state or attitude
which needs to be attributed to a speaker to secure … that what appears to be a violation by
him of a conversational maxim is only a seeming, not a real, violation. (WoW 370, emphasis
added).
Let us stick with (B). What Grice says here seems to be this: we sometimes
need to ascribe a mental state Δ with the propositional content q (Δ[q]) to a
speaker S in order to maintain the presumption that S is conforming to the
Cooperative Principle; the implicatum, however, is not the proposition Δ[q] but
simply q.
Let us see what happens when we apply Grice’s characterization of implicature
to example (4). BelC(¬(4*)) is plausibly a mental state the ascription of which is
needed to maintain the presumption of cooperation. This, however, means that
the content of that belief (“It is not the case that Bonnie stole all the pears”), not
a proposition describing that belief, is the implicatum. What about the weak
implicature ¬BelC(4*)? The first thing to note is that Grice’s characterization
9 Although Geurt’s recipe is tailored to cases in which there is a stronger lexical item (i.e., to scalar
implicatures), it seems to involve some assumptions that may be construed as implying that all implicata
are epistemic. If, as is suggested by (ii.), an implicatum is something that explains an act of saying, then
(assuming that only mental states can explain such acts) all implicata will be of the form “S ψ-s that p.”
See also Geurts’s “general format for the derivation of conversational implicatures” (2010, p. 14).
10 This assumption goes under various names. “Competence assumption” (van Rooij and Schulz, 2004)
is perhaps the most common term.
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seems barely applicable to such cases because ¬BelC(4*) does not ascribe a “psy-
chological state or attitude” to C: ¬BelC(4*) is about the absence of a belief.11
But even if we construe non-belief as a “limiting case” of a psychological state,
there seems to be no plausible candidate for a non-epistemic implicatum. By
uttering “Bonnie stole some of the pears,” C clearly does not implicate that Bon-
nie stole all of the pears; and although it is true that C might plausibly be taken
to have implicated that Bonnie did not steal all of the pears, that proposition
would be just the demodalised strong implicatum. If we take Grice’s characteriza-
tion of implicature at face value, there is simply no place for weak implicatures:
by uttering “Bonnie stole some of the pears,” a speaker implicates that Bonnie
did not steal all of the pears, and that is all.12
Although I regard this result as intuitively appealing, others might take this to
be a reductio ad absurdum of Grice’s claim. An opponent might concede that
Grice in fact thought implicata to be the contents of psychological states but take
this to be a flaw in his original approach. So is there any systematic reason not to
construe propositions about our beliefs as what is being implicated? I think there
is: claiming that implicata are generally epistemic would lead to an odd asymme-
try between saying and (conversationally) implicating as the two main kinds of
non-natural meaning (henceforth: meaningNN). Grice’s overall approach to
meaningNN has often been described as a kind of “mentalism” (cf. Putnam, 1998,
p. 298), and in a way this is clearly correct. For Grice, speakers don’t mean a
thing if they ain’t got … well, rather complex audience-directed intentions. In the
course of his career, Grice considered different proposals for specifying the nec-
essary intention: it might be the speaker’s intention of making an audience believe
that p (WoW 217) or the intention of making an audience believe that the speaker
believes that p (WoW 110), but as far as I see Grice has always firmly opposed
the view that anything psychological might intrude into the proposition a speaker
means (unless, of course, speakers are talking about what is going on in their
minds).
Consider one of the cases that was intended as a counterexample to Grice’s
early analysis of meaningNN (WoW 213-23):
(5) Schoolmaster S: When was the Battle of Waterloo?
Examinee E: The Battle of Waterloo was fought in 1815 (=p). (WoW 106-8)
11 Suppose some person P does not know anything about, say, stamps. On that assumption, the sen-
tence “P does not believe that the Penny Black was issued in 1840” will be true, but it clearly does not
ascribe a mental state to P because otherwise each of us would have infinitely many causally inert mental
states.
12 Things are even worse in the case of “S does not know in which town C lives,” where we cannot
even draw a distinction between a psychological state and its content. In the next section, I will argue
that such cases are not examples of implicature proper.
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Clearly, E does not want to make S believe that p; however, E plausibly may wish
to make S believe that E believes that p. Now should we say that, in this case, E
also meansNN that E believes that p? Grice’s answer is “no” (WoW 108) because
a positive answer would entail that by uttering “The Battle of Waterloo was
fought in 1815” speakers might mean different things, depending on the situation.
(Compare the exam case to a lesson on the Napoleonic wars in which the same
sentence is uttered by the teacher.) And if the meaningNN of “The Battle of
Waterloo was fought in 1815” were that situation-dependent, then Grice’s overall
project of explaining sentence meaning in terms of speaker meaning would be
seriously threatened (cf. WoW 124-9).
To sum up: when speakers say things, what they meanNN is almost never
psychological in character. So why should we assume things to be different
when speakers communicate via implicature?13 One possible answer to that
question will be briefly discussed in §5, but let us first turn to weak
implicata.
4. Weak Implicata
As we have seen in section 3, the “standard recipe” is based on the assumption
that there are two kinds of epistemic implicata: weak implicata of the form Δ p
and strong implicata of the form Δp. Let us first turn to the weak variety, focus-
sing on ignorance implicatures. To see what might be wrong with such implicata,
first consider an instance of Moore’s paradox:
(6) Dogs bark, and I don’t believe that they do (cf. Moore, 1962, p. 277)
It seems tempting to explain the absurdity of (6) roughly along the following
lines (see Gazdar, 1979, p. 46; Martinich, 1980, p. 224; Huang, 2014, p. 34): by
asserting that dogs bark, a speaker S conversationally implicates that S believes
that dogs bark. Because this is exactly the proposition the right conjunct of
(6) denies, (6) is pragmatically incoherent, although not semantically
inconsistent.
Although in the case of Moore’s paradox, it seems as though Grice’s notion of
implicature can be employed to solve a still perplexing problem, Grice explicitly
warned against that approach. When speakers say or assert that p, they thereby
13 I am assuming here, that — pace Saul (2002) — implicature is, for Grice, indeed a species of
speaker’s meaning. Grice, after all, introduces the words “implicature,” “implicate,” and “implicatum” as
“terms of art” that are supposed to do “general duty” for a larger “family of verbs” such as “suggesting,”
“implying,” and “meaning” (see WoW 24). So it seems clear that Grice is concerned with what speakers
actually want to convey.
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express their belief that p, but they do not implicate that they believe so (WoW
42).14 Grice’s point, however, is not purely terminological:
On my account, it will not be true that when I say that p, I conversationally implicate that I believe
that p; for to suppose that I believe that p … is just to suppose that I am observing the first maxim
of quality on this occasion. (WoW 42)
More generally, Grice proposes to restrict the set of possible implicata to “non-
trivial” (WoW 41) cases. There are, for Grice, no implicata that are (roughly)
equivalent to the proposition that a speaker is conforming to a certain maxim.15
Is there any systematic reason to accept Grice’s restriction? I think there is
because in such cases the calculation of an implicatum would be either trivial or
utterly circular. Depending on how you look at it, you would either demonstrate a
proposition p which could not have been demonstrated without assuming that p,
or you would simply repeat a proposition which was used as an assumption
before. A proposition that S is conforming to some maxim cannot be both an
implicatum and an assumption that is needed in order to calculate the (alleged)
implicatum. (I shall offer an additional rationale for Grice’s restriction in §5.)
Unfortunately, Grice did not heed his own warning. Consider, again, the dia-
logue from §2, repeated (and renumbered) here:
(7) A: Where does C live?
B: Somewhere in the South of France
Grice claims that B implicates here that B does not know in which town C lives.
A crucial assumption needed to calculate the implicatum is, as Grice put it, “the
supposition that B is aware that to be more informative would be to say some-
thing that infringed the second maxim of quality. ‘Don’t say what you lack ade-
quate evidence for’” (WoW 33). Grice’s wording here is somewhat
cumbersome,16 so let me offer an alternative way of specifying the essential
assumption:
(8) B is aware that saying something more specific than “Somewhere in the South of France”
would mean saying something B does not know.
14 If that claim of Grice’s is also valid for “factual” (i.e., assertive) implicata (cf. WoW 370), then, by
conveying an epistemic implicatum, the speaker would generally express a higher-order mental state,
which does not strike me as particularly plausible.
15 Could not one argue that “Dogs bark” cannot be construed as implicating “I believe that they do”
because conversational implicatures are cancellable, whereas instances of Moore’s paradox show pre-
cisely that there is a non-cancellable relation between assertion and belief? I do not think so. There are,
after all, felicitous instances of Moore’s paradox (see Crimmins, 1992). Thanks to an anonymous reader
for pressing me on this point.
16 One might even wonder whether we may ascribe that supposition to a thinker who has not read
some of Grice’s works.
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(8), however, still seems to be just a fancy way of saying that B does not know in
which town C lives. At the same time, (8) seems to be tantamount to the claim
that B conformed to the maxims of quantity and of quality. The so-called
implicatum, then, is nothing else than the assumption needed for its calculation,
and thus, according to Grice’s own proviso, by uttering “Somewhere in the South
of France” a speaker S does not conversationally implicate that S does not know
more than that.17 “Ignorance implicatures,” then, ought not to be construed as
examples of implicature proper. They are, rather, best seen as pragmatic infer-
ences hearers sometimes make in order to explain a seemingly uncooperative
utterance.
5. Strong Implicata
Let us now turn to strong implicata of the form Δ p. In section 2 of this paper, I
argued that, for Grice, implicata do not normally contain epistemic terms as main
operators. Accordingly, when Clyde utters
(9) Bonnie stole some of the pears,
he will ordinarily convey (9a) and not (9b) or any other epistemic implicatum
(9a) Bonnie did not steal all of the pears.
(9b) For all C knows, Bonnie did not steal all of the pears.
Grice, however, might have been wrong about that. Maybe there is good reason
to construe implicata as epistemic. I do not think so, and here is why.
An essential element in the overall picture of implicature due to Grice is the
notion of a “common purpose” (WoW 26). Now Grice was well aware of the fact
that communication serves different purposes. His examples of implicature and
meaningNN in general, however, are almost exclusively assertive in character.
18 In
Grice’s examples, people exchange information about a world whose denizens
are, typically, medium-sized dry goods such as buses, broken china, garages, and
poor philosophers (see, respectively, WoW 214, 218, 32, 33).
If exchange of information is the purpose of communicating, then, in order to
conform to the maxim of quantity, the “total signification” (WoW 41) of an utter-
ance U (i.e., what is said by uttering U plus what is being implicated by U) has
to be exactly as informative as is required. As we shall see, epistemic implicata
17 See also Atlas (2005, p. 53) who claims that, in Grice’s discussion of the “Somewhere in the South
of France” example, Grice confounds reasons for not making a stronger statement with what a speaker
means.
18 As stressed by Grice himself (WoW 28), his maxims, particularly the maxims of quality and quan-
tity, would need to be “generalised” (how exactly?) to allow for cases of non-assertive communication.
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are generally an impediment to meeting this requirement. Implicata of the form
“S believes that …” are at best indirectly relevant and so less informative than
required; implicata of the form “S knows that …” are generally more informative
than required.19 This point is more readily seen in the case of what is being said.
Suppose you ask an addressee for the time. In standard cases, a cooperative
addressee will not answer your question by saying “I know/believe that it’s a
quarter past nine” but by simply saying “It’s a quarter past nine.” (You were, after
all, requesting a piece of information about the world, not about the addressee’s
epistemic stance.) To be true, there are cases in which speakers, by using locu-
tions such as “I believe that …” or “For all I know …,” indicate that their episte-
mic situation might be nonideal; however, ordinarily people convey information
about the world by directly saying what is the case.
When engaging in information exchange, what we say will typically not
involve epistemic operators. So why should we take certain implicata to be, in
general, epistemic? The only plausible rationale that comes to mind here would
be the assumption that speakers are generally less certain about what they impli-
cate than about what they say, but that assumption does not seem to be true.
There are all sorts of reasons for implicating something rather than saying
it. Implicatures make communication more economical (scalar implicatures being
a salient example); merely implicating something may be a matter of politeness
(think of Grice’s letter of recommendation from §1); by communicating indirectly
we can avoid legal consequences or social sanctions (Pinker et al., 2008;
Camp, 2018); by implicating something we may convey intentionally vague mes-
sages (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, p. 56); implicatures may mark power relations
between the interlocutors (Cappelen and Dever, 2019, p. 16); they may be more
entertaining than plain speech (Sainsbury, 1984, p. 427); and perhaps they are
psychologically more effective (Green, 1987). There may be cases in which com-
municating by implicature is due to ignorance, but such cases seem to be the
exception rather than the rule.
Now if speakers do not, in general, choose to implicate something rather than
saying it because of their non-ideal epistemic situation, the Gricean approach
seems to commit us to construe implicata as non-epistemic. Take “Bonnie stole
some of the pears” as an example again. Using Frege’s assertion sign to indicate
what Grice called “factual” (as opposed to “imperatival”) implicata, the total sig-
nification of that utterance may be identified with a sequence comprising the
19 Implicata of that kind are not only more informative than is required. Because “know” is, on all
accounts, a (weak) presupposition trigger, such implicata may also lead to a confusion as to the speaker’s
main point (cf. Stalnaker, 1974, p. 55). Because epistemic implicatures are typically construed as involv-
ing beliefs, I will ignore “knowledge implicatures” in what follows.
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what-is-said content “‘ (Bonnie stole some of the pears),” plus one of the three
following implicata:
(9c) ‘(Bonnie did not steal all of the pears)
(9d) ‘(S believes that Bonnie did not steal all of the pears)
(9e) ‘(S does not believe that Bonnie stole all of the pears)
The weak implicatum (9e) is clearly the least informative,20 and given the pur-
pose of information exchange, even the “strong” implicatum (9d) is significantly
less informative than (9c). Thus, if we take a speaker S to have meant (9d), or
(9e) instead of (9c), this would be tantamount to the claim that S did not conform
to Grice’s first maxim of quantity. The key idea of Grice’s account of implicature
is that the assumption of cooperativeness gives us access to a layer of content that
goes beyond what was said, and assuming, as the standard recipe does assume,
that the “strong” implicatum is the most informative implicatum a speaker may
have meant would thus be at odds with the very mechanism of communication to
which Grice appeals. Beliefs such as (9d) are irrelevant to the purpose of ordinary
information exchange.
The above argument is, of course, also applicable to clausal implicatures. Con-
sider, again, the ignorance implicature from section 2 (B: “C lives somewhere in
the South of France”). According to Grice’s description of the scenario (WoW
32), finding out where C lives is the accepted purpose of the communicative
interchange, and none of the interlocutors knows anything more specific than that
C lives in the South of France. Now the alleged implicatum that B does not know
where C lives is simply not informative with respect to that common purpose;
that proposition is, at best, a kind of excuse that explains why B was not able to
say anything genuinely informative. On Grice’s view, an implicatum is essentially
a propositional content that, by either supplementing or replacing what is said,
“transforms” a seemingly uncooperative speech act into an utterance that is in
line with the Cooperative Principle (cf. Grice’s characterizations of implicature
quoted in §3.) Now, given B’s epistemic situation, what is said by the sentence
“C lives somewhere in the South of France” achieves a perfect balance between
the maxims of quantity and of quality. Thus, there is no need for an additional
content that would make B’s utterance cooperative. (Being cooperative does not
involve being omniscient.) But even if we assume that the sentence on its own is,
in a way, uncooperative (it is, after all, not the most informative answer to the
question under discussion), the additional pseudo-implicatum about B’s lack of
more specific knowledge would not make B’s utterance any more informative
20 Recall, moreover, that lacking a belief is arguably not a mental state at all (cf. §3). So even on the
assumption that implicata are epistemic, (9e) is plausibly not an implicatum.
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with respect to what the conversation between A and B is about, that is, the
whereabouts of C.
And if that is correct, there is an additional rationale for Grice’s non-triviality
requirement (cf. § 4): trivial “implicata” generally do not increase the relevance
or informativeness of an utterance. Thus, speakers who abide by the Cooperative
Principle and the maxims do not normally implicate propositions about their own
mental states.
6. Disjunctions
Up to now, I have focussed on the ignorance implicature allegedly carried by
“Somewhere in the South of France” and on the scalar implicature arising from
sentences involving “some.” Let us finally have a brief look at disjunctions and at
what speakers might implicate by employing them. Consider an example from
§2, repeated (and renumbered) here:
(10) B is either crazy or a liar.
Next consider how Soames characterizes the implicatures carried by disjunctions
and the way to calculate them:
Since one has asserted the weaker statement expressed by the disjunction rather than the statement
expressed by either disjunct, … the presumption that one is obeying the conversational maxims
requires one’s hearers to conclude that one lacks adequate evidence to assert the statement
expressed by either disjunct. … So, someone who asserts the proposition expressed by ⌜A or B⌝
typically conversationally implicates that he/she does not know … the proposition expressed by A,
or the proposition expressed by B, but that he/she does have adequate grounds for thinking that
both can’t be false. (Soames, 2008, p. 445)
When applied to (10), what Soames claims here would mean that by uttering
(10) a speaker S conversationally implicates two things:
(10a) S does not know whether B is crazy or a liar.
(10b) S has grounds for thinking that it is not the case that B is not crazy and not a liar.
According to Soames, then, there is not only the ignorance implicatum (10a) but
also an additional epistemic implicatum concerning S’s grounds, that is, (10b). I
am not sure why Soames added (10b), but I would guess that (10b) is supposed
to capture Grice’s idea that uttering a disjunction “implicates the existence of
non-truth-functional grounds for A or B” (WoW 49).21 However, because “both
21 For Grice, a non-truth-functional ground or reason for the disjunction “B is either crazy or a liar” is
a reason that does not depend on a reason for either “B is crazy” or “B is a liar.” (Uttering a disjunction
when having a conclusive reason for one of the disjuncts would normally infringe the maxim of Quan-
tity.) See WoW 44-49.
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can’t be false” is logically equivalent to “at least one is true,” (10b) just articu-
lates the constraint that S ought to have some (truth-functional or non-truth-func-
tional) reason for what S said: a reason for “B is crazy” is, after all, a ground for
thinking that it is not the case that B is not crazy and not a liar.
So instead of (10b), let us consider Grice’s original proposal (WoW 47),
according to which a speaker S, when uttering (10), implicates:
(10c) S has non-truth-functional grounds for B is crazy or a liar.
The first thing to note here is that (10c) differs from all other cases of
implicature, including “normal” cases of epistemic implicature, in that (10c)
involves a peculiar higher-order implicatum. (10c) is neither concerned with the
world nor with an ordinary epistemic state of S but instead with a ground for
what has been said by S. This is odd. Moreover, it seems highly unlikely that
(10c) is something normal speakers would want to communicate. On the plausi-
ble assumption that speakers cannot mean something if they do not have the con-
ceptual resources necessary for grasping the proposition meant, one might even
claim that ordinary speakers cannot implicate (10c). (10c), after all, essentially
involves the technical concept non-truth-functional ground, which ordinary
speakers plausibly do not possess.
But maybe we can articulate the idea behind (10c) in a way that evades techni-
cal concepts. Having a non-truth-functional ground for A or B implies not having
a ground for A and not having a ground for B, and, on the assumption that knowl-
edge requires grounds, this would mean that S does not know that A and that S
does not know that B. This, in turn, might be taken to mean that (10c) is, roughly,
tantamount to (10a), and although (10c) is an alleged implicatum that ordinary
speakers are not able to grasp, (10a) seems to be a psychologically plausible
implicatum.
Accordingly, (10a) is the only salient candidate for an implicatum that needs to
concern us here, and what I shall say about (10a) will not come as a surprise. Not
knowing whether A or whether B simply is not the sort of thing speakers impli-
cate. Treating such propositions as implicata would, again, infringe Grice’s non-
triviality requirement. If a speaker S wants to observe the first maxim of quantity
(“Make your contribution as informative as is required”) and the second maxim
of quality (“Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence”), then not
knowing whether A or whether B will give S a reason for uttering a disjunction;
however, reasons for uttering something are not to be identified with what is
implicated. Moreover, knowing S’s reason typically does not have any genuine
informational value for an addressee H: if S utters a disjunction and if H knows
that S attempts to be as informative as possible, then H may trivially infer that S
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does not know more, but that inference does not retrieve something genuinely
informative relative to typical communicative purposes.22
In the next, and final, section, I shall discuss a possible objection to what I
have attempted to show here: does it really matter whether we call certain prag-
matic inferences “implicatures”?
7. Implicatures versus Implicature-like Phenomena
Because, in the case of (10), I have conceded that the proposition that A does not
know whether B is crazy or a liar may be pragmatically inferred by an addressee,
one might suspect that much of what I have been arguing here amounts to a mere
verbal dispute. If an addressee may infer that proposition, does it really matter
whether we call that kind of interpretation process “pragmatic inference” or
“implicature”? Whereas I do not think that the linguistic labels we attach to cer-
tain communicational phenomena are of any importance, especially so because
implicature is a term of art, I think it is of utmost importance to use separate
labels for phenomena that are different. And there is a difference between “igno-
rance implicatures” and genuine cases of implicature: in the first case, an
addressee infers nothing more than that a speaker was in fact conforming to cer-
tain maxims; in the second case, a maxim is used in order to calculate a proposi-
tion that is actually informative.
Confounding these two cases is an instance of a more general confusion that
Bach takes to be one of the “top 10 misconceptions about implicature.” There is,
according to Bach (2006, p. 26), a temptation to ignore the distinction between
what a speaker means and the conditions that have to be met in order for an utter-
ance to be felicitous. In §4, we have already encountered one example where that
distinction has been ignored by some scholars: asserting p without believing p is,
plausibly, infelicitous; however, by asserting p you do not implicate that you
believe p to be true. Rather, you express one of your beliefs.
Now confounding implicature with other (though similar) phenomena is not
restricted to cases in which the other phenomenon is a felicity condition. Several
post-Gricean accounts of communication suggest that there are all sorts of cases
in which the overall message of an utterance transcends its literal content and
which are not examples of implicature (narrowly construed). Take, for instance,
22 Recall that Grice’s maxims of quantity and of relation are relativised to specific purposes of a talk
exchange (WoW 26). Now consider a context in which a sentence such as (10) is likely to be uttered, for
instance a context in which (10) is offered as a reason for why C said something patently false. I fail to
see how, in such a context, the utterer’s lack of knowledge may be even mildly relevant. More generally
still, conveying your lack of knowledge is, I think, not a genuine “move” in an informational language
game. It is more like a higher-order comment on why you are not able to make a real move.
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the kind of “off-record” communication exemplified by sexual innuendos and
concealed threats (“Nice restaurant you got here, be a shame if anything hap-
pened to it”). One of the puzzling features of such examples is this: because, in
many cases, the speaker S knows quite well that the addressee will be able to
retrieve S’s implied message, why do speakers refrain from simply saying what
they want to get across? Here’s an explanation which I think is quite plausible in
some cases:
Imagine that Harry says, “Would you like to come up and see my etchings?” and Sally demurs.
There is little or no uncertainty about Harry’s intent, and none about Sally’s: Sally knows that she
has turned down an overture, and Harry knows that she has turned down an overture. However,
Sally does not necessarily know that Harry knows; she might think to herself, “Maybe Harry
thinks I’m naïve.” In addition, Harry does not necessarily know that Sally knows that he knows;
he might think to himself, “Maybe Sally thinks I’m obtuse.” Although there is individual knowl-
edge, there is no common knowledge, and they can maintain the fiction of friendship. (Pinker
et al., 2008, p. 837)
According to the explanation offered by Pinker et al., off-record communication
prevents certain propositions (or other kinds of contents such as a proposal) from
becoming common knowledge among the interlocutors. Now it is widely recog-
nized that a proposition p cannot be meantNN, and thus also not be implicated,
unless the speaker wants p to become common, or mutual, knowledge (see,
e.g., Schiffer, 1972, pp. 30–42). Accordingly, Harry’s communicative attempt in
the above example ought not to be construed as a fully fledged case of conversa-
tional implicature. Rather, it should be described as implicature minus common
knowledge.
And there are quite a few additional implicature-like phenomena.23 I shall
briefly discuss three of them:
7.1 Associated contents
Consider a sentence discussed in Frege’s “Über Sinn und Bedeutung”:
(11) Napoleon, who recognised the danger to his right flank, himself led his guards against the
enemy position. (Frege, 1892, p. 46)
On Frege’s view, a speaker who utters (11) will normally intend to convey, and
will be understood as conveying, that Napoleon’s recognition of the danger was
the reason for leading his guards against the enemy position. This side-thought or
Nebengedanke is, for him, something that simply comes to mind due to
23 There are two further (but more controversial) cases that are worth mentioning here: the proposi-
tional expansions or completions Bach (1994) discusses as “implicitures” and Levinson’s “presumptive
meanings,” which are based “on general expectations about how language is normally used”
(2000, p. 22).
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psychological associations (see Sander, 2021, § 3).24 Side-thoughts are similar to
conversational implicatures in that an utterance communicates a non-encoded
proposition; however, in contrast to implicatures, that proposition is not calculated
but rather associated.
7.2 Non-propositional contents
Grice treats metaphor as a prototypical instance of conversational implicature
because what a metaphorical sentence literally says is either patently false (“You
are the cream in my coffee”, WoW 34) or obviously true (“No man is an island”),
the addressee has to look for an alternative proposition the speaker wanted to
convey. But is it even remotely plausible that metaphors convey determinate prop-
ositional contents? Grice was aware of the general problem that some
implicatures convey rather vague messages and tried to account for it by claiming
that implicata may be disjunctions, sometimes open-ended disjunctions (WoW
40). But even on that proposal, what metaphorical utterances convey would be
essentially propositional, which might be taken to be highly implausible in many
cases (cf. Davidson, 1978).
The underlying problem is actually not restricted to metaphors. Sperber and
Wilson (1995, p. 57) claim that “much of what is communicated does not fit the
propositional mould” and offer the following example:
(12) Peter: What do you intend to do today?
Mary: I have a terrible headache.
It seems clear that Mary does not want to communicate a simple proposition here,
and construing what she is attempting to convey as a complex disjunction of
propositional contents also does not seem to be terribly convincing. Should not
we rather take the communicative content of her utterance to be an amorphous
cloud containing propositions, propositional fragments, attitudes, mental images,
emotions, and so forth?25 And if all that is correct, there are implicature-like phe-
nomena in which the “implicatum” is either non-propositional or not wholly
propositional.
24 The mechanism discussed by Frege was arguably rediscovered by Geis and Zwicky, who similarly
appeal to tendencies of the human mind (1971, p. 562) in order to explain what they call “invited
inferences”.
25 Recall that, on the orthodox Gricean picture, you cannot express an emotion via an implicature
since implicata are essentially propositional (though you can implicate that you are in a certain emotional
state). More generally, it is not really clear what a Gricean account of genuinely expressive content might
look like. Probably, one would need to construe expressing as something analogous to Gricean saying,
but I shall leave that for another occasion.
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7.3 UnmeantNN contents
Third, there are cases in which the addressee is not attempting to find out what
the speaker actually attempted to communicate. Two salient members of that fam-
ily are cases in which the addressee’s inference is based on the literal content of
the speaker’s utterance and on certain features of the communicative situation
(Gauker, 2001),26 and cases in which the addressee’s inference is not intended to
uncover what the speaker S actually meant but rather the message that S “made
available” (Saul, 2002).27
It is worth noting that “ignorance implicatures,” although being implicature-
like phenomena, are essentially different from all of the phenomena I have just
listed. In all these cases, there is an interpretation process that enriches the literal
content of an utterance. For instance, “Napoleon did H because of being in men-
tal state S” is more informative than “Napoleon, who was in mental state S, did
H,” and the stronger content of the former sentence can be retrieved by a specific
mechanism of pragmatic enrichment.
Ignorance implicatures, in contrast, are best not construed as a means of getting
access to additional communicative contents. The specific value of such infer-
ences instead appears to concern the interpersonal dimension. Suppose you are
given a fairly uninformative answer (e.g., “Somewhere in the South of France”).
In such a case, you may either assume that the speaker, being uncooperative, is
concealing information from you. Or you may assume that the speaker is cooper-
ative but ignorant on the exact whereabouts of a certain person. By explaining an
uninformative answer in the latter way, you can dispel the suspicion of
uncooperativeness, and so you are able to maintain a spirit of trust towards the
speaker (which may be vital for future interactions). Construing such inferences
as run of the mill examples of implicature misses the real function they have for
our social life.
8. Concluding Remarks
I have been arguing here against the claim that implicata are epistemic, which is
not to deny that utterances may sometimes serve as clues to the speaker’s episte-
mic states. Thus, we should not think of the notion of conversational implicature
as a one-size-fits-all cap that is becoming to any situation in which what a
speaker conveys or what an addressee infers goes beyond the literal content of
26 Gauker thinks that these “situated inferences,” as he calls them, make the notion of conversational
implicature ultimately dispensable. I disagree with him, but I think we should acknowledge situated
inferences as a genuine communicative phenomenon.
27 Saul thinks that this is Grice’s official account of implicature. I disagree with her, but I think we
should acknowledge such “normative” inferences as a genuine communicative phenomenon.
© 2021 The Author. Theoria published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Stiftelsen Theoria.
19THE MYTH OF EPISTEMIC IMPLICATA
the speaker’s utterance. Rather, we ought to acknowledge the existence of several
implicature-like phenomena, alleged cases of epistemic implicatures being one
of them.
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